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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Corporations: Payment of dividends by a foreign corporation
from proceeds of sales of stock grounds for ouster.-The case of
State ex. rel. Spillman, Attorney General v. Brictson Manufacturing
Company, (Neb.) 205 N. W. 246, presents a very unusual example of
an illegal declaration of dividends by a foreign corporation.
The company, a South Dakota corporation, was incorporated with a
capital stock of $5,ooo,ooo, and obtained a license to do business in and
to sell its stock in Nebraska. An extensive campaign was commenced
for the sale of stock by means of agents and advertising of the most
alluring nature. This resulted in the sale of $326,ooo worth of stock.
Upon the trial it was disclosed that the corporation was doing a very
small and unprofitable business. A receiver was appointed and an
audit of the books showed that over a five year period, the business had
been conducted with a loss of nearly $33,ooo. Nevertheless, two annual
dividends amounting to about $64,ooo had been declared which, on account of the condition of the company, had been apparently paid out
of the proceeds of the sale of stock. At no time were the earnings
sufficient to pay a dividend and the petition of the attorney general to
have the corporation ousted was granted.
The court said that: "The payment of dividends by the corporation
from the proceeds of the sale of its stock was a violation of the statutes
and the policy of the state and in the interests of the present and
prospective shareholders and we think it was well within the province
of the state to oust the respondent."
The decision was based on the theory that the corporation was organized for the purpose of defrauding those who might become stockholders, that it had violated laws of the state by fraudulently paying
dividends which it had not earned, and was conducting a small and
unprofitable business in the state merely for the purpose of keeping its
charter alive and resulting in the depletion of the capital stock and
assets.
The doctrine that dividends may be paid only out of the actual legitimate net earnings of the corporation is familiar and receives universal
recognition both in this country and in England. To declare a dividend
with the knowledge that there is no profit, is clearly illegal.1 In many
jurisdictions, and in Wisconsin,2 this is expressly stipulated by statute.
That capital stock is, in a sense, a trust fund for the benefit of creditors,
is also familiar, and any diminution would prejudice their rights or,
as in the instant case, prejudice the rights of prospective shareholders
by inducing them to place their money in the hands of a defunct corporation.
What authority then has the state to oust a foreign corporation for
such fraudulent conduct? Foreign corporations are mere guests of the
state and can be dealt with as the state deems proper. A wrongful act
which, if committed by a domestic corporation, would render it liable
to a forfeiture of its corporate existence, will render a foreign corv. Seip Coal Co., 25 Mo. App. 439; Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, 146 Wis.
132 N.W. 13o; Miller v. Payne, 15o Wis. 354, 136 N.W. 811.
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poration liable to a forfeiture of its franchise to do businessqin the
state.3
Generally, to warrant the judgment of ouster, there must have been
a wilful and improper act or neglect such as to work or threaten a substantial injury to the public. Where a foreign corporation commits
acts dangerous to the public, and which were forbidden by its franchise
or by a general rule of law, the state may ask for the revocation of its
license to do business within the state.'
Foreign corporations in Wisconsin are subjected to all liabilities
and restrictions that are imposed upon domestic corporations," and for
a failure to comply with such provisions, the attorney general is authorized to institute ouster proceedings against such a corporation.'
R. W. RuEHL
Evidence: Proof of office custom of mailing letters: Sufficiency.
-Ponder v.Jeffersoii Standard Life Insurance Company, 6 Fed. (2d)
300, (1925), was an action upon three policies of life insurance taken
out by plaintiff's husband with the defendant company. The defense
interposed was that certain checks given by the insured for premiums
were dishonored and that the policies had thus lapsed for non-payment
of the premiums. The defendant claimed that proper notices of the
dishonors had been given to the insured. Plaintiff denied that any such
notices had been given, none being found among the insured's effects.
Employees of the defendant company testified that these notices were
sent out in the usual course of business, carbon copies having been
retained. The court held that evidence that the notices were mailed
according to the custom of the business was sufficient to constitute
evidence of delivery, and it was not necessary that the identical person
who deposited the letters should testify from personal knowledge that
the letters were in fact mailed.
The efficient operation, methods, and adequacy of the governmeit
postal service have generally been considered sufficient to raise the prima
facie presumption of due delivery to and receipt by the addressee of
mail matter placed within the control of the service.' The presumption
does not arise, however, until there has been due proof of the addressing, stamping
and mailing of the letter or matter claimed to have been
2
sent.
'State v. Standard Oil Co., iii Minn. 85, 126 N.W. 482.
'State v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., (La.) 71 So. 137.
'Sec. 226.02, Wis. Stats.
'Sec. 226.09, Wis. Stats., Williams v. Brewster, 117 Wis. 370, 93 N.W. 479.
'McDermott v. Jackson, 97 Wis. 64, 72 N.W. 375; Small v. Tonun of Prentice,

io2 Wis. 256, 78 N.W. 425; Corry v. Sylvia y Cia, 192 Ala. 550, 68 So. 891. Ann.
Cas. I917E, 1052 and note; Keogh v. Peck et al., 316 IIl. 318, x47 N.E. 266, 38
A.L.R. 115I. In the two Wisconsin cases cited it was held that "proof of the
mailing of a letter in time to reach the person to whom it was addressed in the
regular course of the mails, prima facie establishes the fact that it was so received." For an extensive note upon presumptions as to receipt of communications sent in the mails see 49 L.R.A. (NS) 458.
"Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed. sec. 95.

